The Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v.
Introduction
Since the landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, federal regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) has become one of the most controversial environmental issues of the 21st century.1 Rather than inspiring unified action, this controversy has led to legislative indecision in an attempt to devise a solution to global warming.2 The United States has refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol,3 and the potential Part I of this Note outlines the basic legal framework of the CAA, as well as how the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA impacts that regulatory framework with respect to GHGs. Part II presents the potentially explosive applicability of the CAA to GHGs in a post-Massachusetts v. EPA world. Part III delineates the EPA's regulatory response to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision and the subsequent applicability of the CAA to GHGs. Part IV presents the legal challenges that have arisen in the wake of the EPA's actions. Part V defends the EPA's actions, drawing on the text and legislative history of the CAA, as well as judicial precedent.
I. Legal Framework

A. Overview of the Clean Air Act
The CAA is a comprehensive federal statute regulating pollutant emissions from various sources.14 A forward-looking and precautionary statute, the CAA seeks to regulate pollutant emissions in order to reduce levels of air pollution to certain health-based standards nationwide. 15 In its central provision, the CAA calls for the Administrator of the EPA to identify and list air pollutants that "cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."16 The EPA must then set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)17 at a level that provides an "adequate margin of safety" that is necessary to protect public health.18 States must then attempt to achieve the NAAQS promulgated by the EPA for each air pollutant through the adoption of a State Implementation Plan, which the EPA may either approve or reject based on certain criteria.19 To date, the EPA has set NAAQS for six different pollutants un- . NAAQS are health-based, ambient air quality standards that denote an acceptable amount of certain pollutants in the air for each air pollutant. Id. The EPA is authorized to set both primary and secondary NAAQS-the former at a level necessary to protect public health and the latter at a level necessary to protect public welfare. Id. The secondary NAAQS are less relevant to the analysis in this Note.
18 Id. § 7409(a)-(b). 19 Id. § 7410(a), (c). A State Implementation Plan (SIP) is a regulatory plan, promulgated by each state and approved by the EPA, that provides a comprehensive legal frame-der the Act.20 To facilitate the maintenance of NAAQS, the CAA also contains provisions for review of new and modified sources to ensure that these sources employ advanced technology.21 New or modified major sources must obtain permits prior to construction and must meet certain requirements. 22 The Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program is a subset of the CAA's preconstruction permitting scheme that applies in areas of the country with air quality clean enough to meet the NAAQS for each pollutant (attainment areas), or in areas that are unclassifiable. 23 The purpose of the PSD Program is to prevent the deterioration of air quality in these regions of the country that would otherwise not be regulated because they meet the NAAQS. 24 The provision applies to all new or modified facilities that have the potential to emit at least 250 tons per year of any air pollutant. 25 Finally, Title II of the CAA contains a provision that regulates automobile emissions.26 Specifically, Title II provides that the EPA shall promulgate regulations and "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class . As the political environment evolved to encompass new discoveries regarding climate change, the CAA itself was being interpreted more expansively by courts.41 In November 1973, the EPA published final regulations concluding that lead in gasoline endangers42 public health and thus should be regulated under the CAA.43 Industry groups challenged the final rule on the ground that there was not sufficient concrete evidence to prove that lead additives in gasoline endanger public health, and thus the rulemaking was found to be arbitrary and capricious. 44 Nevertheless in 1979, the D.C. Circuit upheld the rulemaking in Ethyl Corp. v . EPA, holding that because the CAA is a precautionary and preventative statute, it is the EPA's responsibility to regulate and prevent harm, even if that harm is not certain or is based on incomplete evidence.45
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.46 Instead, the CAA and "common sense demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable."47 to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," and the Act's sweepingly broad definition of air pollutant, the Court found that there is no doubt that GHGs are were controlled under the CAA.70
Furthermore, although the EPA argued that the Act allows the Administrator to use personal judgment in issuing an endangerment finding, the Court found that this judgment extends only to a determination of whether an air pollutant "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."71 In other words, the CAA, according to the Court, provides the EPA with no discretion to consider factors external to the statutory text when making the decision to regulate.72 Accordingly, the Court gave the EPA three options on how to proceed: "(1) issue a finding that GHG-related air pollution 'may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,' (2) issue a finding of no endangerment, or (3) provide a 'reasonable explanation' for why the agency cannot or will not exercise its discretion to make such a determination."73 Noting the mandatory nature of the language in the statute, the Court concluded that if the EPA were to issue an endangerment finding under the terms of the Act, it must regulate GHG emissions from automobiles.74
The Endangerment Finding
In response to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, after "careful consideration of the full weight of scientific evidence and a thorough review of numerous public comments," the Administrator of the EPA issued an endangerment finding on December 15, 2009.75 The EPA Ad-68 See id. An "endangerment finding" is the common term for a finding that an air pollutant may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare under the terms of the Act. ministrator found the body of scientific evidence at the time compellingly supported a finding of endangerment.76
The EPA defined the relevant air pollutant as an aggregate "mix of six long-lived and directly-emitted greenhouse gases,"77 that taken together endanger human health by changing Earth's climate.78 Specifically, the Administrator found that GHGs present a risk via "changes in air quality, increases in temperatures, changes in extreme weather events, increases in food-and water-borne pathogens, and changes in aeroallergens."79 Furthermore, the EPA found that automobile emissions of this air pollutant contribute to the air pollution that endangers human health and welfare.80 Therefore, according to the words of the statute, the EPA was now required to regulate GHGs.81 II. Chain Reaction: The Non-Discretionary Nature of Regulation Under the CAA
The Court explained in Massachusetts v. EPA that an endangerment finding would not result in drastic changes to the current regulatory system, but would only result in a slight regulation of new motor vehicle emissions standards tempered by a consideration of costs.82 Scholars have noted, citing consequences regulating greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) under the CAA, that the Court's reassurances seem misinformed.83 They forewarn, that "[t]he CAA is a highly interconnected statute."84 As a result, the EPA's endangerment finding has the potential to set off a "regulatory chain reaction" under different sections of the CAA.85 
A. National Ambient Air Quality Standards
The CAA requires the EPA to issue National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for an air pollutant within twelve months of its listing for regulation.86 Furthermore, the EPA must list a pollutant for regulation if: (1) the pollutant will "cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,"87 (2) the pollutant's existence in the air "results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources,"88 and (3) the EPA intends to provide air quality standards under section 108 of the CAA.89
The EPA's endangerment finding manifests that criteria (1) and (2) are satisfied.90 First, the very fact of the endangerment finding implies that, in the EPA Administrator's judgment, GHG emissions from mobile sources cause or contribute to air pollution that is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.91 Satisfying the second prong, the EPA notes that GHGs are emitted by far more numerous and varied sources than are other pollutants regulated under the Act.92
Commentators note, however, that the third criterion appears to provide the EPA with discretion regarding whether to issue a NAAQS for any air pollutant, even if an endangerment finding has already been issued.93 In other words, read literally, the word "plans" seems to imply that the EPA Administrator has complete discretion regarding whether to list a pollutant, regardless of its dangerousness or ubiquity.94 When looking at the structure and legislative history of the CAA, however, a scholar contends that this result was not intended.95 For example, Title I of the CAA is centered upon a series of deadlines and mandatory EPA duties enforceable by citizen suits.96 "If subparagraph C allows EPA to 86 42 U.S.C. § § 7408(a), 7409(a). Section 7408(a) requires the EPA to issue quality criteria for each pollutant for which an endangerment finding has been issued. choose whether to proceed with the air quality criteria for a particular pollutant, then the whole series of apparently mandatory obligations becomes unhinged."97 In fact, it was not long after the passage of the CAA that the Second Circuit argued this same position in their decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train in 1976.98 In that case, in which the EPA believed that it had discretion not to issue a NAAQS for lead under section 108, the Second Circuit disagreed.99
The structure of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, its legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act leave no room for an interpretation which makes the issuance of air quality standards for lead under § 108 discretionary. The Congress sought to eliminate, not perpetuate, opportunity for administrative foot-dragging. Once the conditions of § § 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) have been met, the listing of lead and the issuance of air quality standards for lead become mandatory.100
Thus, because the GHG endangerment finding satisfied the first and second prongs of section 108 of the Act, many legal analysts have argued that the EPA now has a mandatory obligation to list GHGs as a criteria pollutant and promulgate a NAAQS.101 Nevertheless, the EPA has not taken any action toward this end, essentially ignoring the Second Circuit's opinion and retaining the discretion-that the court seemed to foreclose-not to list GHGs.102
B. Regulation Under the PSD Preconstruction Permitting Program
In addition to arguably requiring the EPA to establish a NAAQS for GHGs,103 the endangerment finding and subsequent regulation of mobile source emissions also triggers the application of the CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program to GHGs.104 The PSD Program requires new major sources and proposed modifications to existing major sources of air pollutants to obtain a permit prior to construction.105 For PSD purposes, the CAA defines "major emitting facility"106 as (1) a source in a specifically enumerated source category that is capable of emitting 100 tons per year (tpy) of any air pollutant or (2) any other facility that is capable of emitting 250 tpy of any air pollutant.107
Historically, there was some debate about the definition of "major emitting facility," and thus to which sources the PSD Program applied. 108 In 1978, after the EPA promulgated regulations implementing the PSD Program under the 1977 Amendments to the CAA, the regulations were challenged in court.109 In its interpretation of the applicability of the PSD provisions to certain sources of air pollution, the D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v . Costle noted that the PSD Program applies very broadly.110 The term "any air pollutant," according to the court, meant any pollutant that is otherwise regulated under the Act, even those pollutants for which NAAQS have not been established. 111 The court held that the PSD Program was not meant to apply only to a limited class of defined pollutants, but to all facilities that had the potential to emit large quantities of any harmful substances that "befoul our nation's air."112 Thus, citing the broad applicability of the PSD provisions outlined in Alabama Power, scholars have noted that once GHGs are regulated under the Title II mobile source program, they also become regulated under the PSD Program. 113 Unlike the promulgation of a NAAQS for GHGs,114 the Obama administration has chosen not to ignore the triggering of PSD applicability, and has issued a rule applying PSD provisions to GHG emitters under the CAA.115 This rule, which the EPA refers to as the Tailoring Rule, is the focus of this Note.116
C. Practical Implications of the Chain Reaction
The applicability of various provisions of the CAA to GHGs has the potential to affect millions of sources across the United States.117 Specifically, and most relevant to this Note, the PSD provision of the CAA requires preconstruction permits for major stationary sources of any air pollutant in excess of 250 tpy.118 Currently, only large industrial factories (and some small manufacturers) are subject to the PSD requirements because they are the only sources large enough to emit more than 250 tpy of the currently regulated pollutants.119 Unlike the pollutants currently subject to regulation under the Act, however, GHGs are emitted in large quantities not only by industrial facilities, but also by small commercial structures.120 Therefore, if the PSD provision were to become applicable to GHGs under the current text of the Act, approximately 1.2 million buildings and facilities across the country would become subject to the PSD preconstruction review process and permitting requirements (according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).121
This potential increase presents significant problems, as the PSD preconstruction review process is expensive.122 First, firms must comply with PSD requirements by implementing best available control technology to reduce emissions according to industry best practices.123 Furthermore, each source must undergo a lengthy permitting process with the local agency to ensure its compliance with the PSD requirements.124 EPA has estimated that each permit costs the regulated source an average of over $125,000 and requires the EPA (or the state environmental agency) to invest over 300 hours and $20,000.125 
III. The Regulatory Response: The Chain Reaction Generates Absurd Results
A. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In the first official EPA response to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, the EPA, under the outgoing George W. Bush administration, issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR), which noted the far-reaching implications of the Court's ruling and solicited comments regarding the prospect of regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the CAA.126 The EPA expressly noted the likelihood that the applicability of the Act to mobile sources would also trigger applicability of other CAA provisions to small stationary sources.127 Specifically, the EPA noted in the ANPR the high likelihood that, if the EPA were to issue an endangerment finding, it would immediately trigger PSD requirements for sources with the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year (tpy) of GHGs.128 Noting the harmful effects that regulating GHGs under these provisions would have on the American economy, the EPA in 2008 aligned itself emphatically against the idea.129
[T]he Clean Air Act, an outdated law originally enacted to control regional pollutants that cause direct health effects, is ill-suited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases. Based on the analysis to date, pursuing this course of action would inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations.130
B. The Tailoring Rule and the Absurd Results Canon
The Tailoring Rule
The Obama administration did not take the concerns raised by the Bush administration in the ANPR lightly.131 In fact, the Obama administration echoed these concerns even more strongly, noting that "[i]f PSD . . . requirements apply at the applicability levels provided under the CAA, State permitting authorities would be paralyzed by permit applications in numbers that are orders of magnitude greater than their current administrative resources could accommodate."132 The EPA noted, as it did under its predecessor regime, that the number of sources regulated under the PSD Program would be astronomically high and overwhelm administrative resources.133 Specifically, the EPA estimated that per-year PSD permit applications would increase from 280 to approximately 41,000, a 140-fold increase.134
Rather than denounce the CAA as an outdated and improper mode of regulating GHGs,135 however, on October 27, 2009, the EPA published a proposed rule that would alter and delay the applicability of the PSD Program for certain GHG emitters.136 To address the difficulties noted above, the proposed tailoring rule advocated a phasing approach to the application of the PSD Program to GHGs.137
During
Step I, beginning on January 2, 2011, no sources will be subject to regulation-and thus, subject to PSD permitting-based solely on GHG emissions.138 Instead, only sources that already require PSD permits based on their potential to emit non-GHG pollutants-so called "anyway sources"139-must meet PSD permitting for GHGs.140 Furthermore, Step I only applies if the newly constructed facility will have the potential to emit at least 75,000 tpy of GHGs (or a modified facility, where the modification results in at least a 75,000 tpy emissions increase), measured in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO 2e ).141
The second step, which begins on July 1, 2011, accounts for GHG emissions standing alone when determining whether a source must apply for a PSD permit.142 In addition, after this date, a new source will be subject to PSD permitting requirements if it has the potential to emit 100,000 tpy of CO 2e ( GHG emissions by 75,000 tpy CO 2e for an existing 100,000 tpy CO 2e -emitting source).143 This is a significant relaxation of the normal statutory threshold of 250 tpy of any air pollutant.144 Finally, the EPA noted in the Tailoring Rule that it would issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking sometime in 2011 to address the potential applicability of the PSD provisions to smaller sources. 145 The EPA will complete this rulemaking by July 2012 and it will go into effect in July 2013. 146 The Agency made clear, however, that PSD regulations would not apply to sources with the potential to emit less than 50,000 tpy of CO 2e until at least April 2016.147
According to the EPA, this new, phased approach will not only significantly alleviate the financial burdens of the new rule (both on EPA and on regulated sources), but also will not comprise the overall goal of reducing GHG emissions.148 That is, even after the second step, only about 550 new sources-as opposed to tens of thousands149-will come under regulation,150 while eighty-six percent of GHG emissions that would be reduced under a facial application will still be reduced under a tailored application of the statute.151
Absurd Results: The Legal Basis for Rule
The key question that arises from the Tailoring Rule is, given the statutory language that defines a major stationary source as a factory with the potential to emit 250 tpy of any air pollutant subject to regulation under CAA,152 from where does the EPA derive the authority to rewrite this definition for the purpose of regulating GHGs? The answer, according to the EPA, comes from both agency discretion established in The Court further noted that Congress may delegate authority on a particular issue to an agency in implicit rather than explicit terms, and, in such cases, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."157 Finally, the Court observed a long judicial history of according considerable weight and deference to agency interpretations of the statutes it has been trusted to administer.158
b. Absurd Results
By applying Chevron deference to the Tailoring Rule, the EPA invokes the absurd results doctrine to provide a legal justification for its decision to override the text of the statute and tailor the PSD Program to encompass GHGs.159 According to the clear text of the Act, the PSD provisions are applicable to any new or modified major source that emits more than 250 tpy of any air pollutant.160 Thus, under a traditional Chevron analysis, Congress did not afford discretion in its interpretation of the PSD applicability threshold because the statute was un- The absurd results doctrine, according to the EPA, stands for the proposition that "where a literal reading of a statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply has no meaning . . . and is the proper subject of construction by EPA and the courts."163 In other words, if applying the literal meaning of legislation would produce a result that is senseless and is inconsistent with congressional intent, then "the literal meaning . . . should not be considered."164 In such a case, the agency should proceed under the second prong of the Chevron analysis-as if Congress had not addressed the issue or had done so ambiguously-applying a reasonable construction of the Act to the issue at and tpy-provided it acts reasonably in light of congressional intent.168 portant to this Note's analysis. First, the movants argued that the enh
. 165 The EPA feels that the CAA's literal application to GHGs would be absurd, given the consequences.166 Specifically, the EPA posits that the agency structure would be so backlogged that it would be impossible to implement an effective permitting program.167 Thus, the EPA argues that it is free under Chevron to implement its own interpretation of the Act-namely, to change the PSD applicability threshold from 250 tpy to 100,000
IV. Legal Challenges to EPA Action
On September 15, 2010, after the EPA published its final Tailoring Rule, a group of industry representatives (the movants)-led by the Coalition for Responsible Regulation-filed a motion seeking to stay the implementation of the EPA rules.169 The movants, in a brief in support of their motion to stay, made two primary arguments that are im- 
A. Challenge to the Endangerment Finding
First, the movants argued that the EPA illegally sub-delegated their authority to outside agencies to conduct the scientific analysis underpinning the endangerment finding.172 Specifically, they contended that section 202(a) of the CAA requires the EPA Administrator to issue an endangerment finding when, in the Administrator's judgment, the pollutants may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.173 In issuing the endangerment finding, however, the EPA primarily relied on outside studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to form the basis of its scientific analysis.174 Thus, according to the movants in this case, the EPA Administrator did not exercise the Administrator's own judgment, and thus the EPA's issuance of the endangerment finding was outside the grant of authority in the statute.175
B. Challenge to the Tailoring Rule
The movants also challenged the Tailoring Rule, contending that the EPA's invocation of the absurd results doctrine is an arbitrary and capricious answer to a problem it created through an initial misreading of the CAA.176 Specifically, the movants argued that the PSD provisions in the CAA were meant only to apply to the criteria pollutants already defined in 1977, the time of passage, and not to future criteria pollutants or any other emissions.177 They asserted that the correct interpretation of the language "each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter" contained in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions is a present-tense interpretation applicable only to pollutants contemplated by the 1977 Act.178 Thus, under their reading of the statute, regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from vehicle emissions would not trigger the applicability of the PSD provisions at all.179 Such a reading would render the invocation of the absurd results doctrine unnecessary.180
In other words, the movants argued that the EPA created the absurd results themselves by refusing to follow the unambiguous reading of the statute.181 The movants further argued that by applying the PSD provisions to GHGs-an act that they were without authority to do-the EPA unlawfully created the absurd result that, as the EPA claimed, gave it authority to ignore the plain text of the Act.182 "EPA cannot create its own administrative necessity by ignoring one provision of the Act, and then solve that manufactured necessity by ignoring another."183 V. Absurd Results? Not So Absurd After All
The movants' arguments in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, presents strong challenges to the legal authority underlying EPA's Tailoring Rule.184 The Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, set in motion a mandatory chain of greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation under the CAA, which, given the congressional intent behind the Act and the EPA's role in implementing it, make the EPA's actions both legally justified and mandatory.185
A. The Endangerment Finding and Applicability of the PSD Provisions Were Mandated by Massachusetts v. EPA and Legislative Intent
First, the movants argued that the EPA was not legally authorized to issue an endangerment finding.186 This argument, however, is foreclosed by the legislative history of the Act, by the Act's broad language, and by long-standing precedent, including Massachusetts v. EPA.187
The Evolution of a Flexible Statute
The precedent and legislative history surrounding the CAA urges a forward-looking, precautionary, and flexible approach to its applica- tion.188 First, in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit noted that the language of CAA and related judicial interpretations manifests its precautionary nature and provides the EPA with discretion-and, in fact, a mandate-to regulate to "precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived threat."189 The court further noted that in the case of precautionary statutes such as the CAA, and where scientific evidence is uncertain and cutting-edge, the EPA need not provide "rigorous step-bystep proof of cause and effect," but instead must only make a reasonable judgment based on the available science that the pollutant will endanger public health or welfare. 190 The legislative history of the CAA confirms the D.C. Circuit's analysis.191 In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to codify the court's holding in Ethyl. 192 Specifically, Congress amended endangerment language in the Act, changing "which endangers" to "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger" to solidify the EPA's broad discretion when regulating under such a forward-looking, precautionary statute.193
The Mandate of Massachusetts v. EPA
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA clearly stated that the EPA must take action toward regulating GHGs under the CAA or provide a statutory justification for not doing so.194 Specifically, the Court mandated that the EPA take one of three courses of action: (1) issue an endangerment finding; (2) "issue a finding of no endangerment;" or (3) provide a "reasonable explanation" for its decision not to act. 195 Although the EPA ultimately chose the first option, based on the Court's opinion and the language of the Act, it was more a requirement than choice.
First, the language of the statute, when considered in light of judicial precedent, ensures that option two is not viable.196 As is clear from case law, the EPA has broad authority and, in fact, a mandate to regulate preventatively in the face of uncertain science.197 Also, the language of the Act clearly establishes that weather and climate effects are included in the possible harms to public welfare that may be considered in an endangerment finding. 198 Second, the Supreme Court's explanation of the extent of the EPA's judgment in whether or not to act effectively removes the viability of the third option.199 The Court noted that "the use of the word 'judgment' is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text."200 Instead, the only discretion that the EPA possesses is whether GHG emissions "cause[], or contribute[] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. "201 Furthermore, the Court makes clear that declining to regulate for external reasons, such as political circumstances or scientific uncertainty, are not valid uses of the EPA's discretion. 202 The only question, the Court notes, is "whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding."203 Given the circumstances surrounding the case, this question could only be answered in the affirmative.204 Thus, the EPA may not simply decline to consider the issue of climate change under the Act.205
The Appropriateness of the Endangerment Finding
Finally, contrary to the movants' arguments in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, the EPA acted appropriately in relying on IPCC research regarding climate change and did not impermissibly subdelegate its authority to the IPCC. 206 Although an agency may not simply rubber stamp the research and reports of an external entity, it may utilize these reports in forming its own opinion. 207 The agency did not blindly approve the scientific articles on which it based the endangerment finding.208 Instead, it conducted an indepth analysis of the IPCC findings, considering the foundation, con-sensus, and trends of the scientific information, and reexamined these findings in light of public comment. 209 Furthermore, as the D.C. Circuit noted in Ethyl, the EPA has a duty to regulate in a preventative manner under the CAA when faced with cutting-edge issues and uncertain science.210 Therefore, even if the EPA itself could not find conclusive evidence of human-generated climate change, it still retained the responsibility to regulate in a reasonable manner to prevent the possibility of harm.211 Furthermore, as the EPA noted in the endangerment finding, the science was far from uncertain-rather, the evidence that GHGs endangered human health and welfare was compelling.212 
PSD Applicability to GHGs Was Mandatory
The movants argued that the text of the Act was meant to apply only to pollutants subject to regulation at the time the PSD provisions were passed in 1977. 216 The D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, however, held that the terms of the PSD provisions apply "extremely broadly" to sources that emit more than a certain threshold of "any air pollutant."217 In fact, the court found that the provisions apply to major emitting facilities for each pollutant that is regulated under any section of the CAA. 218 Indeed, since the decision in Alabama Power, the EPA's regulations have applied the provisions of the Act quite broadly-to any pollutant properly subject to regulation.219 The EPA further defines "subject to regulation" as "subject to . . . a provision in the Clean Air Act . . . that requires actual control of the quantity of emissions of that pollutant."220 In other words, the regulations promulgated under the PSD provisions, reflecting judicial precedent, have made clear that the phrase "any air pollutant" broadly encompass any pollutant that is subject to actual control under any provision of the CAA.221 This is clearly not limited to criteria pollutants or pollutants that were subject to regulation at the time of the 1977 enactment.222
Therefore, as soon as the EPA passed rules governing the emission of GHGs for vehicle tailpipe emissions under section 202(a), GHGs became subject to actual control for the purposes of the PSD provision. 223 At that time, according to the clear regulatory language and longstanding practice, GHGs were also covered under the PSD provision of the CAA.224 Thus, the movants' contention that the EPA's invocation of the absurd results doctrine was based on a misreading of the PSD provisions of the Act was, itself, based on a misreading of the Act.225 Movants argue:
[i]t makes no sense to conclude that a pollutant regulated for one purpose (tailpipe standards), from one category of sources (cars), under one title of the statute (Title II), based on one set of findings (under Section 202(a)), automatically must be regulated for an entirely different purpose (permitting programs), under a totally different regulatory scheme (Titles I and V), when emitted from a wholly separate category of sources (stationary).226
The very opposite is true. 227 The movants' argument that the Tailoring Rule could have been avoided by a different construction of the Act is flawed because there was no other possible construction of the CAAthe applicability of the PSD provisions to GHGs was mandatory.228
The Absurd Results Doctrine Is Consistent with Chevron and Its
Invocation Is Entitled to Deference
In their brief, the movants claimed that the EPA's invocation of the absurd results doctrine was outside of its authority because the language of the statute is clear.229 According to this line of reasoning, the movants argued, the court should uphold the unambiguous nature of the statute.230 Some legal commentators have echoed this argument, noting that the EPA possesses discretion in interpreting the statute only when the text of the statute does not address an issue or does so ambiguously.231 "[T]here is nothing ambiguous," these scholars argue, "about the 250 tpy standard already established under the Clean Air Act." 232 A closer reading of Chevron, however, manifests the flaw in this logic. 233 Chevron stood for the proposition that agencies enjoy wide discretion when the congressional intent is not clear from the statutory text.234 Thus, simply because the text of the legislation is clear on its face, it does not necessarily follow that congressional intent is clear when applying that text to a problem that Congress could never have anticipated. 235 To understand congressional intent, one must look past the text of the statute and to its objectives and other policy considerations. "236 This is precisely what motivated EPA's drafting of the Tailoring Rule.237 Rather than focus on the clear words of the statute-the 250 tpy threshold for PSD applicability-the EPA realized that these words would not represent congressional intent when applied to GHGs. 238 The PSD Program was not meant to apply to small sources of air pollutants, but instead, only to the truly large emitters that presented the potential to generate serious harm to the nation's pristine air quality regions. 239 Thus, an approach that exempted smaller sources, but still applied the program to larger sources was reasonable-and arguably necessary-to uphold congressional intent. Not only did Chevron provide a legal justification for the EPA's action, but the context surrounding the decision made clear that invocation of the Chevron doctrine was the only legally justifiable option.241 On the one hand, the EPA could not ignore the Court's clear instruction to act, the compelling evidence that GHGs endanger human health and welfare, and the regulatory cascade that such a finding generated. 242 On the other hand, the EPA could not apply the clear language of the PSD provision to GHGs because such action would override congressional intent. 243 Clear precedent interpreting the CAA, its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA all reinforce the conclusion that the CAA is a flexible, precautionary statute and the EPA's mandate was to regulate in a preventative manner so as to anticipate future harms.244 Furthermore, the Court stated that the fact that paralyze businesses and permitting authorities and clearly undermine the intent of Congress.254
Conclusion
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA drastically changed the way the CAA dealt with GHGs.255 The Court itself, however, could never have anticipated or intended the regulatory consequences that its ruling generated.256 The Court's holding mandated the EPA's endangerment finding, which in turn mandated the promulgation of a rule regulating GHG emissions from vehicles, which in turn sparked the applicability of the CAA's PSD Program to stationary source GHG emitters.257
The EPA faced a perilous choice. On the one hand, it could employ a literal application of the PSD Program-requiring any new source with the potential to emit more than 250 tpy of GHGs to apply for a PSD permit before construction-paralyzing permitting authorities and potentially destroying the U.S. economy.258 On the other hand, the EPA could choose not to regulate GHGs under the PSD provision of the Act.259 Both decisions, if implemented, would violate the congressional intent underlying the CAA.260
Thus, the EPA chose neither.261 Instead, it tailored the PSD applicability threshold from 250 tpy to 100,000 tpy, drastically rewriting the provision to specially account for GHGs.262 While at first glance this appears to be an abuse of agency discretion, on closer examination, the EPA's action seems consistent with the principles enumerated in Chevron.263 Furthermore, it seems to be a well-reasoned decision, which furthers the EPA's long-established preventative role in implementing the CAA.264
